Files
daedalus/python/src/gpgtools/spec.md
T
nvaldez 41c8b99bd6 feat: gpgtools ssh-config-summary - per-host table of gpg-enabled logins (v0.11.0)
- read-only: one row per marker-managed block in ~/.ssh/config (or
  --config PATH): alias, hostname, user, key id (first 8 chars of
  the identity's SHA256 fingerprint via ssh-keygen -lf, material
  digest as fallback), and the fallback identity's name
- no managed blocks / missing config: fact + configure_ssh hint,
  exit 0 always (read-only command)
- spec items 2.8 + section 13 first, then tests, then code (SPEC
  6.12); 10 new tests (100 in test_gpgtools.py), registry
  description, README section, CHANGELOG 0.11.0, version pins

Generated by Mistral Vibe.
Co-Authored-By: Mistral Vibe <vibe@mistral.ai>
2026-11-19 09:49:35 +01:00

18 KiB

gpgtools specification

Complete description of python/src/gpgtools/gpgtools.py. Change this file first, then tests, then code (SPEC items 6.11 and 6.12). Items are cited as gpgtools spec item N.M.

1. Purpose

  • 1.1 gpgtools automates the YubiKey SSH flow documented in the owner's wiki guide (~/repositories/vibe-wiki/wiki/queries/yubikey-ssh-guide.md): initialize_yubikey covers guide steps 1-4 (fresh machine ready for GPG), send_pubkey covers steps 5-6 (key to a server). store_publickey covers the on-site bootstrap case (section 11): installing the key from the machine that access is being granted to. Guide step 7 (per-host ~/.ssh/config) is out of scope.
  • 1.2 Hard constraint: the YubiKey's OpenPGP applet is never written - no gpg --card-edit, no keytocard, no applet reset. Only public card data is read; the card PIN is typed by its owner into pinentry, never passed through this script.
  • 1.3 The user's real GNUPGHOME is written only where section 7 says so; remote public-key imports go to a throwaway home (item 4.5).
  • 1.4 Standard library only; Python 3.11+ (SPEC item 9.6).

2. Commands

  • 2.1 daedalus gpgtools with no subcommand prints the overview of the subcommands and exits 0.
  • 2.2 daedalus gpgtools initialize_yubikey [--dry-run] [--gnupg-home DIR] - prepares this machine (section 3).
  • 2.3 daedalus gpgtools send_pubkey (--yubikey | --url URL | --fingerprint FP | --pubkey LINE | --file PATH) [--no-verify] [--dry-run] you@server - resolves one SSH public key, proves possession of the private half, appends it to the target (section 4). The five source flags are mutually exclusive and exactly one is required; you@server is required.
  • 2.4 --dry-run on either subcommand prints what would happen and writes nothing; on send_pubkey it resolves and prints the key but never verifies and never connects.
  • 2.5 daedalus gpgtools configure_ssh --alias NAME [--hostname HOST] [--user USER] [--pubkey FILE] [--fallback FILE | --no-fallback] [--config PATH] [--dry-run]
    • writes the per-host ssh client block (guide step 7); behavior in section 10.
  • 2.6 daedalus gpgtools store_publickey (--yubikey | --url URL | --fingerprint FP | --pubkey LINE | --file PATH) [--authorized-keys FILE] [--dry-run] - resolves one SSH public key and installs it into this machine's authorized_keys (section 11). The source flags are the send_pubkey set (items 4.1.1-4.1.5), mutually exclusive, exactly one required.
  • 2.7 daedalus gpgtools initialize [--dry-run] - checks that gnupg is ready on this machine and installs what is missing; the gnupg-only half of initialize_yubikey (section 12).
  • 2.8 daedalus gpgtools ssh-config-summary [--config PATH] - prints the table of gpg-enabled ssh logins found in the config (section 13); read-only.

3. initialize_yubikey behavior

  • 3.1 Step 1 - gnupg: the section 12 flow (item 12.1). When gpg --version fails, the package manager is detected (shutil.which over apt-get, dnf, pacman) and gnupg installed via sudo; no known manager is exit 3. A failed install is exit 2.
  • 3.2 Step 2 - card: gpg --card-status parsed for the Application type/OpenPGP markers; absent card (including gpg error text) is exit 4 with the pcscd hint systemctl enable --now pcscd.
  • 3.3 Card fields: serial (Serial number), authentication subkey presence (Authentication key with a non-[none] value), key URL (URL of public key, [not set] is None), keyring pairing (General key info non-[none]).
  • 3.4 Step 3 - public key: when unpaired and a URL exists, gpg --fetch-keys <url>, then re-parse the card; still unpaired is exit 5. Unpaired without a URL is exit 6 with the manual-import hint.
  • 3.5 A missing [A] subkey logs a warning (SSH via gpg-agent will not work; GPG signing/decryption will) but is not an error.
  • 3.6 Step 4 - agent: the homedir is created at mode 700; gpg-agent.conf gains enable-ssh-support and, only when its key is absent, default-cache-ttl 600 and max-cache-ttl 7200; existing lines, including user TTLs, are kept verbatim and never duplicated. gpgconf --kill gpg-agent restarts the agent. Exit 0.

4. send_pubkey behavior

  • 4.1 Sources (exactly one per run):
    • 4.1.1 --yubikey: the gpg ssh socket from gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket (bare path or prefixed form), SSH_AUTH_SOCK set to it, ssh-add -L. No socket is exit 8 with the initialize_yubikey hint; no keys is exit 8 with "is the YubiKey plugged in?"; several keys refuses with the list and the --pubkey hint rather than guessing.
    • 4.1.2 --url: fetch the armored OpenPGP public key, convert via item 4.5.
    • 4.1.3 --fingerprint: normalize (strip spaces and 0x, case-insensitive, exactly 40 hex chars, else exit 8); resolve through the store chain, first hit wins: local keyring (gpg --export-ssh-key 0x<FP>), then keys.openpgp.org VKS (.../vks/v1/by-fingerprint/<FP>), then keyserver.ubuntu.com (.../pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x<FP>). Every store result is fingerprint-checked before use; a mismatch skips the store. All exhausted is exit 8 naming the stores.
    • 4.1.4 --pubkey: the literal line, validated by item 4.2; exit 8 when invalid.
    • 4.1.5 --file PATH: a file holding the SSH public key line - typically yubikey_auth.pub carried on a USB stick (zero network, zero gpg). Every line is validated per item 4.2: no valid line is exit 8; several valid lines refuse listing them with the --pubkey hint (item 4.1.1 precedent) rather than guessing; an unreadable or missing file is exit 8.
  • 4.2 Key line validation: ssh-(ed25519|rsa|dss|ecdsa-sha2-*) <base64> [comment], full line; anything else is rejected.
  • 4.3 Key material (type + base64, comment ignored) is the key's identity for deduplication and reporting.
  • 4.4 Proof of possession (default, skipped only with --no-verify): a random hex challenge is signed via ssh-keygen -Y sign -U (the private half - card, PIN prompt included - must sign) and verified via ssh-keygen -Y verify against the candidate line with an allowed_signers file. Any failure prints that nothing was sent and exits 10; the ssh target is never contacted.
  • 4.5 Remote conversion: armored keys are imported into a throwaway --homedir via gpg --import, fingerprints listed with --list-keys --with-colons, and the ssh line exported with gpg --export-ssh-key 0x<FP>. The real keyring is not touched; the throwaway home is removed afterwards.
  • 4.6 Send: ssh you@server "cat ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null" to read, then - only when the key material is absent - append the line via stdin with perms forced (mkdir -p, chmod 700 ~/.ssh, chmod 600 authorized_keys). Present is reported, not re-appended. Any ssh failure is exit 7; nothing is appended on failure.
  • 4.7 Both ssh calls run without an interactive terminal: the target must be reachable with existing non-interactive credentials (agent, passphrase-less key, or ControlMaster socket). First contact to a brand-new server by password is out of scope - gain access once manually, then send the key.
  • 4.8 Output (identical in section 11): both resolve-and-store subcommands print the resolved key line, its source, and the SHA-256 hex digest of the key material (item 4.3) before acting, so the resolved value can be compared with the machine the key came from (or read over a phone).

5. Exit codes

Code Meaning
0 success (initialize ready; send appended or already present)
2 package install failed (initialize, initialize_yubikey)
3 gpg missing and no known package manager (initialize, initialize_yubikey)
4 no OpenPGP card found (initialize)
5 public-key fetch did not pair the keyring (initialize)
6 keyring unpaired and the card carries no URL (initialize)
7 ssh to the target failed; nothing stored (send)
8 no source resolved a usable key (send, store); pubkey file missing (configure)
10 proof-of-possession verification failed; nothing sent (send)
11 an unmanaged Host <alias> exists in the config (configure)

6. Runner contract and injectability

  • 6.1 Everything external goes through run_command(cmd, input_text="", env=None) -> (code, stdout+stderr): env variables are merged over os.environ, input_text is piped to stdin, a missing binary returns (127, "<cmd>: not found").
  • 6.2 initialize_yukikey(home, run_cmd), verify_possession(line, workdir, run_cmd), send_key(line, target, run_cmd), and the source_* functions accept the runner; source_url, source_fingerprint, and cmd_send_pubkey also accept a fetch(url) -> bytes | None. Tests inject fakes; defaults are run_command and fetch_bytes (urllib, 30 s timeout, None on any fetch error).
  • 6.3 ssh-keygen signature namespaces and identity are the constants daedalus-gpgtools and daedalus@verify.

7. Files written

  • 7.1 initialize: <gnupg-home>/gpg-agent.conf (merge per item 3.6); the homedir permissions set to 700. Nothing else.
  • 7.2 send: scratch dirs (throwaway GNUPGHOME, challenge workspace) are created under the system temp dir and removed in finally. The only persistent write is the target's authorized_keys append via ssh (item 4.6).
  • 7.3 store: the local authorized_keys (item 11.5) is the only persistent write; its parent gets mode 700, the file 600. Scratch rules of item 7.2 apply when remote sources resolve (item 4.5).

8. Testing approach

  • 8.1 Tests live in python/tests/test_gpgtools.py and never need hardware, a network, or an interactive terminal (SPEC item 6.6): all flows take an injected runner; fetchers and runners are fakes scripted per test by command prefix.
  • 8.2 Covered groups: card-status parsing (present/absent, no URL, no auth subkey, unpaired), config merge (empty, preserving, complete), manager mapping and detection, GNUPGHOME resolution, the initialize flow's success, failure, warning, and persistence branches and the standalone readiness/install/re-check branches (section 12), the five sources including the store chain and fingerprint mismatch, challenge sign/verify success and refusal, send idempotence by material, store: file sources, append, preservation, idempotence, perms, dry run, summary: block parsing (each field), key-id resolution and both id fallbacks, the empty and missing-config paths, and the CLI wiring, guards, and dry runs.
  • 8.3 The change order is spec item 6.12: this spec first, then failing tests, then the smallest implementation.

9. References

  • 9.1 The wiki guide behind items 1.1: ~/repositories/vibe-wiki/wiki/queries/yubikey-ssh-guide.md (steps 1-13; automation notes in section 13).
  • 9.2 Repository rules: SPEC items 6.6 (tests), 6.9 (argcomplete opt-in after the parser), 9.8 (version bump).
  • 9.3 History: CHANGELOG.md entries 0.5.0, 0.6.0 (initialize/send), 0.7.0 (configure_ssh), 0.8.0 (--file source, store_publickey), 0.9.0 (initialize), 0.10.0 (init script), 0.11.0 (ssh-config-summary).

10. configure_ssh behavior

  • 10.1 The block is written into --config (default ~/.ssh/config) between managed markers, one block per alias:
# BEGIN daedalus gpgtools: <alias>
Host <alias>
    HostName <hostname>
    User <user>                       (omitted without --user)
    IdentityFile <pubkey>
    IdentityFile <fallback>           (omitted per item 10.4)
    IdentitiesOnly yes
# END daedalus gpgtools: <alias>
  • 10.2 Defaults: --hostname defaults to the alias itself; --pubkey defaults to ~/.ssh/yubikey_auth.pub; --fallback defaults to ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.
  • 10.3 Idempotence: a run that finds the alias's markers replaces the whole marked block with the newly built one; everything outside the markers is preserved byte-for-byte. Running twice with the same arguments changes nothing.
  • 10.4 The fallback IdentityFile is included only when its file exists and --no-fallback was not given; a missing explicit --fallback FILE logs a warning.
  • 10.5 Guards: a --pubkey file that does not exist is exit 8 with the derive hint; a Host line naming the same alias anywhere outside the managed markers is exit 11 (ssh would let the first match shadow the managed block).
  • 10.6 File hygiene: ~/.ssh is created at mode 700 when missing; the config file is created at mode 600 when missing.
  • 10.7 --dry-run prints the block plus creating/replacing, and writes nothing.

11. store_publickey behavior

  • 11.1 Installs one SSH public key into the current user's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (--authorized-keys FILE overrides) on this machine - the machine the key will later grant access to. Use case: a server with ssh password authentication disabled that no key authorizes yet; you are logged in at its console and install the key from inside, so the machine holding the YubiKey can ssh in afterwards. It is the mirror of section 4: send pushes the key from where it is, store pulls it from where the access is.
  • 11.2 Sources: identical to items 4.1.1-4.1.5, one per run. On a bare server the realistic ones are --pubkey (typed at the console), --file (USB stick; needs no network and no gpg), and --fingerprint (store chain, needs gpg and network); --yubikey works when the card is plugged into this machine. An unresolvable source is exit 8 (item 5).
  • 11.3 There is no proof-of-possession step (item 4.4) and no --no-verify flag: the private half is, by design, elsewhere - this machine is the one being granted access, so nothing here could sign the challenge. Hardening instead: line validation (item 4.2), fingerprint-checked stores (item 4.1.3), and the identity block (item 11.4).
  • 11.4 Identity block: the resolved key line, its source, and the SHA-256 hex digest of the key material (item 4.3) are printed before writing (shared rule, item 4.8), so the value can be compared with the machine the key came from.
  • 11.5 Storage: the parent directory is created at mode 700 when missing and the authorized_keys file forced to mode 600, on every write. Existing entries are preserved verbatim - authorized_keys is a multi-key file; there is no mismatch guard on the rest, only the new key's absence is checked.
  • 11.6 Idempotence follows item 4.3: the line is appended only when its material is absent (comments ignored); already present is reported and exits 0. A missing trailing newline in an existing file is repaired, never glued into a key line.
  • 11.7 --dry-run prints the identity block plus already present/creating and writes nothing.
  • 11.8 No ssh is run and the only persistent write is item 11.5; remote sources keep item 4.5's throwaway-home rule (item 7.3). Exit codes: 0 stored or already present, 8 no source resolved a usable key.

12. initialize behavior

  • 12.1 initialize covers the gnupg half of item 3.1 only - no card, keyring, or agent expectations. gpg --version decides readiness: present prints the version line and exits 0. Missing runs manager detection and the sudo install (item 3.1's manager map); no known manager is exit 3, a failed install is exit 2. After a successful install the check re-runs once - still unusable is exit 2.
  • 12.2 --dry-run performs only the read-only gpg --version, prints what would happen (already ready with the version line, the install command it would run, or the install-manually message), installs nothing, and exits 0 in every dry-run case.
  • 12.3 initialize_yubikey runs this flow as its step 1 (item 3.1); a -2/-3 return stops it before anything else.
  • 12.4 Intended use: the on-site companion to store_publickey (item 11) - on a machine without the YubiKey, run initialize first when a gpg-dependent source (--fingerprint, --url, --yubikey) is wanted.

13. ssh-config-summary behavior

  • 13.1 Scope: every marker-managed block (item 10.1) in --config (default ~/.ssh/config) is one gpg-enabled login. The command never writes and never contacts any host; it reads only the config and the IdentityFiles the blocks name (~ expanded).
  • 13.2 Output is one row per block with the columns alias, hostname, user, key id, fallback: hostname defaults to the alias when the block omits HostName; user prints - when absent (ssh's own default); fallback prints - when the block has no second IdentityFile. Columns are padded and separated by two spaces, like the daedalus script listing.
  • 13.3 Key id: taken from the block's first IdentityFile. ssh-keygen -lf <file> yields the SHA256 fingerprint; the row shows its first 8 chars after the SHA256: prefix (shorter values print in full). When ssh-keygen fails or is missing but the file is readable and holds a valid key line (item 4.2), the id falls back to the first 8 chars of the material digest (item 4.8) - both are stable per key. A missing or unreadable IdentityFile prints - for the id.
  • 13.4 No managed blocks - a missing config file counts - prints that fact with the configure_ssh hint and exits 0.
  • 13.5 Exit code is always 0; the command is read-only and has no failure modes that would leave anything half-done.