The instance-wide maximum upload size in the storage setting and the
per-user UPLOAD_BYTES usage limit were two caps on the same thing, with
a
rule that the per-user value could only lower the instance value. The
storage setting field is removed, and the all-users UPLOAD_BYTES usage
limit is the only per-file cap. A user's own limit replaces the default
in either direction, and no limit means any file size.
- Remove upload_size_limit_mb from the API and store storage settings,
the 32 MiB store default, and the deployment config check.
- Drop the FILE_TOO_LARGE error; every refusal is QUOTA_EXCEEDED with
metric UPLOAD_BYTES.
- Split usagelimit.CheckFileSize out of CheckUpload and call it from
memo import, so import is no longer a bypass.
- Remove the Maximum upload size field from the Storage section and the
instance-limit warning from the usage limits dialog.
The old value is not carried over. Instances that relied on the default
accept any file size until an admin sets a limit.
Bound work an anonymous or low-privilege caller can force:
- Bound thumbnail decoding by declared pixel count before decoding and
remember images that cannot be thumbnailed (over the bound or not
decodable), so a small image declaring billions of pixels is served
as-is instead of decoded on every request. Transient storage read
errors are not remembered. The bound lives in internal/imagelimit and
is shared with EXIF stripping.
- Cap request bodies at 16 MiB for procedures that carry no file bytes;
only inline attachment creation, transcription, and chunked uploads
keep their larger caps.
- Digest over-long submitted usernames before using them as sign-in
limiter keys, add header and idle timeouts to the HTTP server, limit
filter expression size, and cap the SQLite regexp cache.
Close correctness gaps:
- Delete the thumbnail the file server actually writes (.v2.jpeg), its
failure marker, and the legacy name when an attachment is removed.
- Decide EXIF stripping from the sniffed content as well as the declared
type, so a mislabeled JPEG keeps no metadata.
- Revoke every other session when a password changes; an admin reset
revokes all of the target's sessions. Prune expired refresh tokens.
- Enforce the 2 MiB avatar limit the web client already applies.
- Keep S3 object keys unique when the path template has no {uuid}.
- Reject negative attachment page tokens.
- Charge memo archive imports against the write and upload budgets,
charge repeated validate-only plans, discard only attachments an
import actually stored, and refuse archives that declare far more
bytes than they hold.
- Load database-stored attachment bytes only after authorization.
- Remove the unused, unguarded linkmeta.GetImage fetcher.
Frontend: send no referrer when loading external images in memos and
link previews, and drop picture/source from the sanitizer so every
remote image goes through the https-only src rule.
Dependencies: grpc 1.83.1 and x/crypto 0.56.0 for reported advisories.