Bound work an anonymous or low-privilege caller can force:
- Bound thumbnail decoding by declared pixel count before decoding and
remember images that cannot be thumbnailed (over the bound or not
decodable), so a small image declaring billions of pixels is served
as-is instead of decoded on every request. Transient storage read
errors are not remembered. The bound lives in internal/imagelimit and
is shared with EXIF stripping.
- Cap request bodies at 16 MiB for procedures that carry no file bytes;
only inline attachment creation, transcription, and chunked uploads
keep their larger caps.
- Digest over-long submitted usernames before using them as sign-in
limiter keys, add header and idle timeouts to the HTTP server, limit
filter expression size, and cap the SQLite regexp cache.
Close correctness gaps:
- Delete the thumbnail the file server actually writes (.v2.jpeg), its
failure marker, and the legacy name when an attachment is removed.
- Decide EXIF stripping from the sniffed content as well as the declared
type, so a mislabeled JPEG keeps no metadata.
- Revoke every other session when a password changes; an admin reset
revokes all of the target's sessions. Prune expired refresh tokens.
- Enforce the 2 MiB avatar limit the web client already applies.
- Keep S3 object keys unique when the path template has no {uuid}.
- Reject negative attachment page tokens.
- Charge memo archive imports against the write and upload budgets,
charge repeated validate-only plans, discard only attachments an
import actually stored, and refuse archives that declare far more
bytes than they hold.
- Load database-stored attachment bytes only after authorization.
- Remove the unused, unguarded linkmeta.GetImage fetcher.
Frontend: send no referrer when loading external images in memos and
link previews, and drop picture/source from the sanitizer so every
remote image goes through the https-only src rule.
Dependencies: grpc 1.83.1 and x/crypto 0.56.0 for reported advisories.
Fileserver Package
The fileserver package serves binary content (attachments, avatars) over plain HTTP instead of gRPC, so that HTTP range requests work — required for Safari video/audio playback (RFC 9110 §14). Metadata stays on the gRPC API; only bytes are served here.
Endpoints
GET /file/attachments/:uid[/:filename] # attachment binary
?thumbnail=true # JPEG thumbnail for supported image types
?motion=true # embedded motion-photo video clip
?share_token={uid} # access via a memo share link
GET /file/users/:identifier/avatar # user avatar (by username)
Authentication
Handled by server/auth (see authenticator.go and token.go for the constants and token formats). Priority: Authorization: Bearer header (access token or personal access token) first, then the refresh token cookie. See getCurrentUser in fileserver.go.
Authorization
Attachment access follows memo visibility, evaluated by core/access.CheckMemoReadContext:
- Public memo: no auth required (when the instance allows anonymous access)
- Protected memo: any authenticated user
- Private memo: creator only
- Valid
share_token: grants access to that memo's attachments - Unlinked attachment (no memo): creator or admin only
Avatars are public on instances that allow anonymous access; private instances require authentication.
Serving behavior
- Video/audio are streamed with range-request support (
http.ServeFile/http.ServeContentfor local and database storage); S3-backed media is proxied with rangedGetObjectrequests. - Thumbnails are generated at max 600px, cached in
{data_dir}/.thumbnail_cache/, with a semaphore capping concurrent generation. Images with HDR/wide-gamut metadata are served as originals, since re-encoding would strip it. - Motion photos have their embedded video extracted and cached in
{data_dir}/.motion_cache/. - XSS prevention: script-capable MIME types are rewritten to
application/octet-stream, non-media files getContent-Disposition: attachment, and all responses carryX-Content-Type-Options: nosniffplus a restrictiveContent-Security-Policy. - Caching: public attachments get
public, no-cache; private onesprivate, no-store; avatars and thumbnailspublic, max-age=3600.
Testing
Unit tests live in fileserver_test.go, covering permission checks, streaming, thumbnails, and metadata detection. Manual checks:
curl "http://localhost:8081/file/attachments/{uid}/file.jpg"
curl -H "Range: bytes=0-999" "http://localhost:8081/file/attachments/{uid}/video.mp4"