Files
hermes-pi 0226e33ac7 phronesis v0.4.0-dev: add skill linux-server-hardening (security)
- port of the wiki-local linux-server-hardening checklist (v1.2.0) into
  the bundle: audit listeners and accounts, SSH key-only, close unused
  accounts, scoped firewall, fail2ban, unattended-upgrades, surface
  reduction, verify-and-record; new `security` category, announced live
  by the listing per CONTRIBUTING
- SKILL.md body ported verbatim from the source copy; front matter
  adapted to the four-key bundle contract (SPEC 4.2-4.3)
- MEMORIES.md starting template shipped beside it (SPEC 4.7); the
  installed memory is add-only so live instances keep their entries
  (SPEC 6.8)
- tests: bundled load, category listing, and category filter for the
  new skill; autotest fully green (84 tests, 93 percent coverage);
  e2e-verified via the installed pipx CLI

Generated by Mistral Vibe.
Co-Authored-By: Mistral Vibe <vibe@mistral.ai>
2026-11-19 11:50:41 +01:00

9.7 KiB

name, version, description, category
name version description category
linux-server-hardening 1.2.0 Load this skill when a Linux server needs hardening before or after exposure to a network (Debian or Raspberry Pi homelab) - a numbered, human-followable checklist that audits listeners and accounts, enforces SSH key-only, closes unused accounts, scopes the firewall, sets up fail2ban and automatic security updates, and verifies every change with a real probe. security

Linux Server Hardening

A hardening checklist for a Debian-family Linux server, written so a human can follow it top to bottom. Every heading and list item has a stable id; cite one as item 3.4. Items are facts to hold and gotchas; boxes are steps to do and verify. The ground rule throughout: a probe decides, memory and recollection do not.

1. How to use this checklist

  • 1.1 Work in order 2 to 9: audit first (read-only), then change, then verify. Never batch two changes between probes.
  • 1.2 The skill assumes a Debian-family host with sudo; adapt names and paths to the distribution in front of you.
  • 1.3 Before editing any live config, copy it aside: sudo cp -a <file> /tmp/<file>.bak-$(date +%Y%m%d).
  • 1.4 Edit live config in place; never reconstruct it from a template or memory. Diff against the backup after the edit.
  • 1.5 Every change gets a recorded one-line undo (the backup path, the prior shell, the old rule set).
  • 1.6 sudo is assumed on every command below; do not run a shell as root.

2. Audit the exposure

Read-only; change nothing here. Build the picture before touching anything.

  • 2.1 Inventory the TCP and UDP listeners with their owning processes: sudo ss -tlnp and sudo ss -ulnp.
  • 2.2 For every listener, name the service, why it runs, and who may reach it (public, LAN, loopback). No unexplained listener stays unexplained.
  • 2.3 Inventory accounts that can log in: awk -F: '$7 ~ /(sh|bash)$/ {print $1":"$3}' /etc/passwd.
  • 2.4 Inventory accounts with a usable password: sudo awk -F: '$2 ~ /^\$/ {print $1}' /etc/shadow.
  • 2.5 Inventory sudo members: getent group sudo, and check authorized_keys of every human account for content.
  • 2.6 Record the firewall state: sudo ufw status verbose (or the nftables equivalent).
  • 2.7 Record pending updates: apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | tail -n +2 | wc -l and flag the security ones.
  • 2.8 A listener is not an open port: cross the listener list with the firewall rules. "Open" means reachable from a given source, and only the firewall says which sources those are.

3. Harden SSH

  • 3.1 Keep everything in a drop-in, not the main file: /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/10-no-password.conf (included at the top of sshd_config on Debian).
  • 3.2 Write the drop-in with: PasswordAuthentication no, KbdInteractiveAuthentication no, PermitRootLogin no, MaxAuthTries 3, X11Forwarding no, LoginGraceTime 30.
  • 3.3 Validate before activating: sudo sshd -t must print nothing.
  • 3.4 Activate gracefully: sudo systemctl reload ssh. A reload drops no existing session; a restart can.
  • 3.5 Verify the effective config, not the file: sudo sshd -T | grep -Ei '^(passwordauthentication| kbdinteractiveauthentication|permitrootlogin)'.
  • 3.6 Verify behavior with a live probe: ssh -o PreferredAuthentications=none -o ConnectTimeout=5 localhost must answer Permission denied (publickey).
  • 3.7 GOTCHA: if VNC or other services tunnel over SSH (ssh -L), AllowTcpForwarding must stay yes. Turning it off silently kills the tunnels and looks like "server not responding".
  • 3.8 GOTCHA: PermitRootLogin without-password (the default) still allows root login with a key. An empty /root/.ssh/authorized_keys saves you today; say no anyway.
  • 3.9 Check the protocol only on museum-grade hosts: SSH protocol 2 is enforced by the software itself on OpenSSH 7.6 and later - the Protocol directive was removed from the config language and modern sshd cannot speak protocol 1. Verify with ssh -v (Remote protocol version 2.0). A "force protocol 2" item in a modern guide is a staleness marker for the guide, not a gap in the host.

4. Close unused accounts

  • 4.1 For each candidate account, verify first that nothing uses it: ps -eo user,args | grep <name>, sudo crontab -l -u <name>, enabled units, recent logins (sudo last | grep <name>).
  • 4.2 Lock the password: sudo passwd -l <name>.
  • 4.3 Set the shell to /usr/sbin/nologin: sudo usermod -s /usr/sbin/nologin <name>.
  • 4.4 Verify: sudo passwd -S <name> shows L, and getent passwd <name> shows the nologin shell.
  • 4.5 GOTCHA: a password lock does NOT block SSH key login. An account with content in authorized_keys stays reachable until its shell is nologin (or the keys are removed).
  • 4.6 Record the undo: sudo passwd -u <name> plus sudo usermod -s /bin/bash <name> (or the prior shell).

5. Firewall the ingress

  • 5.1 Set the policy: sudo ufw default deny incoming and sudo ufw default allow outgoing.
  • 5.2 Add allow rules scoped to a source, never to Anywhere without a reason; write a comment per rule: sudo ufw allow from 192.168.178.0/24 to any port 22 proto tcp comment 'SSH from LAN'.
  • 5.3 If access arrives through a proxy or jump host, allow exactly that one IP for that port.
  • 5.4 Enable and verify: sudo ufw --force enable; sudo ufw status verbose. The current SSH session must survive the enable; if it does not, you locked yourself out.
  • 5.5 Cover both stacks: repeat rules for the IPv6 prefixes in use, and note that an ISP global prefix can rotate.

6. Brute force protection

  • 6.1 Install and enable fail2ban with the sshd jail (Debian default ships it); verify it counts probes: sudo fail2ban-client status sshd.
  • 6.2 GOTCHA: if public access arrives through a stream or reverse proxy, every internet probe reaches sshd with the proxy's IP. A ban can then only hit the proxy - cutting the owner's own public path (a self-DoS an attacker can trigger) while real attacker IPs stay invisible.
  • 6.3 In that topology, add the proxy to ignoreip (/etc/fail2ban/jail.local, [DEFAULT] section: ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 <proxy-ip>), reload, and verify with sudo fail2ban-client get sshd ignoreip.
  • 6.4 Per-client banning in that topology belongs on the proxy host, against its own (real-client-IP) logs. Do not pretend it works on the backend box.

7. Automatic security updates

  • 7.1 Install: sudo apt-get install -y unattended-upgrades.
  • 7.2 Enable: write /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/20auto-upgrades with APT::Periodic::Update-Package-Lists "1"; and APT::Periodic::Unattended-Upgrade "1";.
  • 7.3 Verify the timers are enabled: systemctl is-enabled apt-daily.timer apt-daily-upgrade.timer.
  • 7.4 Verify the origins with sudo unattended-upgrades --dry-run --debug: the distribution's security origin must be in the allowed list.
  • 7.5 GOTCHA: third-party repositories (vendor repos such as the Raspberry Pi Foundation origin) are not in the default allow list and stay manual; re-check apt list --upgradable occasionally.

8. Reduce the listening surface

  • 8.1 For every listener that survived the audit without a reason, disable both the service and its socket: sudo systemctl disable --now <name>.service <name>.socket (example: rpcbind, when no NFS or rpc is in use).
  • 8.2 Verify the port is gone from sudo ss -tlnp and sudo ss -ulnp; a socket unit can re-activate a service.
  • 8.3 Prefer not running a service over filtering it: a disabled service is closed to every source, forever.

9. Verify and record

  • 9.1 Re-run the probes of section 2; compare listener by listener and rule by rule against the pre-hardening picture.
  • 9.2 Test the public path from a real outside leg (a phone on mobile data), not from inside the LAN, and not through a VPN.
  • 9.3 GOTCHA: consumer VPN exits (verified with Mullvad) silently drop non-web ports; a failed TCP test through such a tunnel says nothing about the port. If a question remains, use https://check-host.net/check-tcp?host=<ip>:<port> or a phone on mobile data.
  • 9.4 Record what changed and how to undo it on the host's wiki entity page, then save the change set as one commit. A hardening step that is not written down did not happen.

10. Memory

  • 10.1 After loading this skill, read MEMORIES once per session. When it is already in context, do not read it again.
  • 10.2 Update it whenever an important memory about this skill comes up: a lasting preference, a correction, a repeated request, or a fact a run verified. Also update it whenever the user explicitly asks you to remember something for this skill. Section 1 of that file says how.