Fixes#51537
`regex::escape()` escapes dashes, but dashes are only special inside
`[]` character classes in regex. This means tool_permissions patterns
end up with unnecessary backslashes:
**Before:** `^https?://typescript\-eslint\.io`, `^git\-lfs\s+pull(\s|$)`
**After:** `^https?://typescript-eslint\.io`, `^git-lfs\s+pull(\s|$)`
The fix adds a small `escape_for_pattern()` helper that calls
`regex::escape()` then strips the unnecessary dash escaping via
`.replace("\\-", "-")`. This is applied to all five call sites in
`pattern_extraction.rs`.
Tests updated to expect unescaped dashes, plus a new
`test_dashes_are_not_escaped` test covering terminal commands, URLs, and
paths with dashes.
This PR was developed with AI assistance.
Release Notes:
- Fixed unnecessary escaping of dashes in agent tool permission patterns
(e.g. `typescript\-eslint` is now `typescript-eslint`)
---------
Co-authored-by: Matt Van Horn <455140+mvanhorn@users.noreply.github.com>
## Summary
Adds a new permission UI for terminal pipeline commands (e.g. `cargo
test | tail`) that lets users selectively always-allow individual
commands in the pipeline, rather than only offering a blanket
always-allow for the first command.
## Screenshot
<img width="464" height="293" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-18 at 3 27 48 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e027eeec-c2b3-4f73-a596-95f42a9adad2"
/>
Release notes:
- The terminal permissions UI now allows you to select individual
subcommands independently.
---------
Co-authored-by: Danilo Leal <daniloleal09@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ben Brandt <benjamin.j.brandt@gmail.com>
Harden the terminal tool's permission system to reject commands
containing shell substitutions and interpolations (`$VAR`, `${VAR}`,
`$(…)`, backticks, `$((…))`, `<(…)`, `>(…)`) before they reach terminal
creation.
## Changes
### Shell command parser (`shell_command_parser`)
- Added structured terminal command-prefix extraction with env-var
prefix support
- Added parser-backed validation that classifies commands as
Safe/Unsafe/Unknown
- Extended normalized command extraction to include scalar env-var
assignments in order
- Preserved quoted assignment values when they contain whitespace or
special characters
### Pattern extraction (`agent/pattern_extraction`)
- Updated terminal pattern extraction to use structured parser output
- Included env-var prefixes in generated allow patterns
- Normalized regex token boundaries to `\s+` while preserving display
whitespace
### Tool permissions (`agent/tool_permissions`)
- Added invalid-terminal-command rejection for forbidden
substitutions/interpolations
- Added unconditional allow-all bypass (global default Allow, or
terminal-specific Allow with empty patterns)
- Preserved hardcoded denial precedence over allow-all
### Terminal tool (`agent/tools/terminal_tool`)
- Updated tool description and input schema to explicitly prohibit shell
substitutions
- Added comprehensive SEC-264 regression test suite (20 new tests)
covering:
- All forbidden constructs (`${HOME}`, `$1`, `$?`, `$$`, `$@`,
`$(whoami)`, backticks, `$((1+1))`, `<(ls)`, `>(cat)`, env-prefix
variants, multiline, nested)
- Allow-all exception paths (global and terminal-specific)
- Hardcoded-denial precedence
- Env-prefix permission flow (matching, value mismatch rejection,
multiple assignments, quoted whitespace)
Closes SEC-264
Release Notes:
- Terminal tool permissions regexes can now match environment variables
(e.g. `FOO=bar cmd arg1 arg2`)
- If terminal tool permissions have active permissions regexes running
on them, then bare interpolations like `$FOO` are disallowed for
security, since regexes wouldn't be able to match on them.
Previously, clicking "Always allow for `cargo` commands" after running
`cargo build --release` would also silently permit `cargo run`
(arbitrary code execution), `cargo publish`, and any other cargo
subcommand. This was overly broad and did not match user intent.
Now the extracted pattern includes the subcommand when present, so the
button reads "Always allow for `cargo build` commands" and the pattern
`^cargo\s+build\b` only matches `cargo build` invocations — not `cargo
test`, `cargo run`, etc.
### How it works
- The second token is included in the pattern when it looks like a
subcommand (alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, no leading `-`).
- When the second token is a flag (e.g. `ls -la`), only the command name
is used — the user sees "Always allow for `ls` commands".
- Single-word commands and path-like commands behave the same as before.
### Examples
| Command | Pattern | Button label |
|---|---|---|
| `cargo build --release` | `^cargo\s+build\b` | Always for `cargo
build` commands |
| `cargo test -p search` | `^cargo\s+test\b` | Always for `cargo test`
commands |
| `npm install` | `^npm\s+install\b` | Always for `npm install` commands
|
| `ls -la` | `^ls\b` | Always for `ls` commands |
| `ls` | `^ls\b` | Always for `ls` commands |
| `./script.sh` | *(rejected)* | *(no pattern button)* |
Release Notes:
- Agent: "Always allow" suggestions for terminal commands are now
subcommand-specific (e.g. "Always allow for `cargo build` commands"
instead of "Always allow for `cargo` commands").
Move shell command parsing logic (`extract_commands` and supporting
code) from the agent crate into a new `shell_command_parser` crate so it
can be reused by `agent_servers` for ACP permission checking.
Release Notes:
- N/A
This PR hardens the authorization flow for all file and directory tools.
## Sensitive settings protection
All file/directory tools (copy, move, create_directory, delete, save,
edit, streaming_edit) now detect and protect sensitive settings paths:
- Paths inside `.zed/` directories (local settings)
- Paths inside the global config directory (`~/.config/zed/` or
equivalent)
Even when the global default is `allow`, modifications to these paths
require explicit confirmation. The authorization dialog title is
annotated with "(local settings)" or "(settings)" to inform the user.
`sensitive_settings_kind` walks up ancestor directories to handle paths
where intermediate subdirectories don't exist yet (e.g.
`~/.config/zed/new_subdir/evil.json`).
## Deferred filesystem operations
Copy, move, create_directory, and delete tools now defer all
project/filesystem operations until after the user authorizes the
action. Previously, some tools began resolving project paths or
traversing directories before authorization.
## streaming_edit_file permissions
`streaming_edit_file` now shares `edit_file`'s tool name for permission
checks, ensuring consistent permission rules between the two edit tool
variants. The duplicated authorization logic is replaced by a shared
`authorize_file_edit` function.
## Copy/move pattern extraction
Copy and move tools now include both source and destination paths in
their permission context (`input_value`). The always-allow pattern is
extracted from the common parent directory of both paths, ensuring the
pattern covers future checks against both.
## Save tool improvements
- Authorization title now shows only the paths that need confirmation,
not all paths
- Title is annotated with "(local settings)" or "(settings)" for
sensitive paths
Release Notes:
- File and directory tool operations now require confirmation before
modifying sensitive settings paths.
<img width="1110" height="280" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-28 at 3 35 52 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4d467e2c-2e7b-4ec7-bc87-6f0df8e667f0"
/>
<img width="1094" height="411" alt="Screenshot 2026-01-28 at 3 40 54 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f559df93-e72e-4457-ba1b-f7d6239f3285"
/>
Previously, if a user configured `^ls` as an always-allow pattern, an
attacker could craft a command like `ls && rm -rf /` which would be
auto-approved because the regex only matched the beginning of the
command string.
Now the command is parsed into individual sub-commands (`ls`, `rm -rf
/`) and EACH sub-command must match an allow pattern for auto-approval.
This prevents shell injection attacks using operators like:
- `&&` and `||` (boolean operators)
- `;` and `&` (sequential/background execution)
- `|` (pipes)
- Newlines
- Command substitution (`$()` and backticks)
- Process substitution (`<()` and `>()`)
## Matching Logic
- **always_deny**: if ANY sub-command matches, deny the entire command
- **always_confirm**: if ANY sub-command matches, require confirmation
(unless always_deny matched, in which case deny)
- **always_allow**: ALL sub-commands must match for auto-approval
(unless always_confirm or always_deny matched, in which case defer to
those)
- If parsing fails, or if the shell is unsupported, then always_allow is
disabled for this command
As usual, `always_allow_tool_actions` supercedes all of these. If it is
`true`, then we always allow all tool calls, no questions asked.
## Shell Compatibility
The shell parser only supports POSIX-like command chaining syntax (`&&`,
`||`, `;`, `|`).
**Supported shells:** Posix (sh, bash, dash, zsh), Fish 3.0+, PowerShell
7+/Pwsh, Cmd, Xonsh, Csh, Tcsh
**Unsupported shells:** Nushell (uses `and`/`or` keywords), Elvish (uses
`and`/`or` keywords), Rc (Plan 9 shell - no `&&`/`||` operators)
For unsupported shells:
- The "Always allow" UI options are hidden for the terminal tool
- If the user has `always_allow` patterns configured in settings, they
will see a `Deny` with an explanatory error message
(No release notes because granular tool permissions are behind a feature
flag.)
Release Notes:
- N/A
---------
Co-authored-by: Zed Zippy <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>